



The rise and decline of 
extreme economic inequality 
in 20th century Japan
A literature review through the 
lens of institutional changes
CHRISTER KOLD LINDHOLM
As economic inequality is rising in many countries around the world, 
the interest in how inequality has risen and declined in the past is 
being revived. Some researchers have seen modern history since 
the industrial revolution as a positive story of economic growth and 
technological progress that enhanced social development for all. 
Others have seen modern political economies as wrought with vicious 
cycles of inequality and social instability. This study investigates the 
rapid rise of economic inequality in Japan beginning in the 1880s 
and its equally dramatic fall in the 1930s. Using the World Income 
and Wealth Database’s new statistical data, I argue that Japan’s early 
economic development was characterised by highly inegalitarian 
institutions: taxation laws transfered resources from agriculture to 
urban centres for decades, corporate, financial and land properties 
were heavily concentrated in top income groups and rights-based 
organisations built by labour and women’s movements took time to 
gain national influence. The unequal strength of these institutions 
prevented economic growth from fostering inclusive development. 
Only with the outbreak of World War II were these institutions 
reformed during the collapse of the global economic system. This 
article thereby supports the development literature that draws clear 
distinctions between unequal growth and socio-economic equality 
tied to institutional change.












When Piketty (2014) published the fruits of his collaborative research on economic inequality, it caused wide-
spread public debate. By applying a unified 
statistical method accounting for both income 
and wealth, the group was able to compare 
inequality in all major economies going back 
over a century. Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century thereby demonstrated for 
the first time how extreme levels of inequality 
have been the normal state of society in today’s 
high income countries. In concrete measures, 
these inequality economists discovered that 
between 1850 and 1940, from when the indus-
trial revolution began in several parts of the 
world until World War II, it was common that 
just 10% of the population in Japan and Europe 
received 40-45% of total national income and 
owned 80-90% of all wealth. In contrast, at the 
bottom of the income distribution, 50% of the 
population merely received a 20-30% share of 
national income and owned less than 5% of 
national wealth (Piketty, 2014; Piketty & Saez, 
2014). During World War II these scales of in-
equality dropped sharply but have started ris-
ing again since the 1980s. Today inequality in 
the US has already reached Europe and Japan’s 
highest 20th century levels. Other studies also 
reveal a gloomy picture. Milanovic (2016) ac-
counted for global income inequality from the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the worldwide 
financial crisis in 2008. He was forced to con-
clude that, on average, in the rich countries the 
bottom half of the income hierarchy has expe-
rienced ‘the absence of growth in real income 
over twenty years’ (Milanovic, 2016, p. 19). With 
stagnating wages in a reformed labour market, 
concentrations of wealth building up again, 
and income from capital surpassing labour 
income (UN 2016), Japan might possibly be 
poised to go in America’s direction (Baldwin & 
Allison 2015). 
Japan in the pre-World War II period is a 
valuable case for understanding inequality’s 
significance in a country’s course of econom-
ic development. As Japan attained industrial 
growth rates in the 1880s, it started a path to 
become the first high income country outside 
of Europe and America, but for half a centu-
ry Japan’s distribution of income growth was 
completely unlike the relatively egalitarian de-
cades in the post-war period. This transition 
from extreme inequality to relatively equal 
growth was anchored in a sweeping confron-
tation with the ‘old world’s’ economic order 
(Piketty, 2014, p. 322). Starting in the key year 
1937, World War II became the setting for a 
global collapse of capital systems, which had 
supported top income groups. State policies 
finally confronted major social divisions with 
redistribution of property and progressive tax-
ation. Labour unions became a powerful par-
liamentary influence. This study ties previous 
research literature to the statistical data pub-




Economic theory: refuting the 
growth-equality nexus
How economic growth is intertwined with 
equality, social hierarchies, parliamentary insti-
tutions and labour’s rights is a long-standing 
question in development scholarship. Econ-
omists writing in the mid-20th century, like 
Kuznets (1955, 26) who deemed that his own 
calculations  were “95 per cent speculation”, ar-
gued that the early phases of industrialisation 
widen income inequality while growth in the 
later stages is a virtuous cycle as it lifts farmers 
into professional and industrial occupations. 
Atkinson (1983, p. 190) questioned this analy-
sis and argued that we are starting to see the 
presence of ‘dynastic’ inheritance again. Lead-
ing economist Minami (1998, p. 55) countered 
the explanation in Kuznets’s theory for Japan 
by linking its equality during the post-war pe-
riod to ‘the new government’s policy of heavy 
taxes on assets and wealth’, concluding that 
‘equality does not always result from econom-
ic growth but can only be realised by strong 
policy measures’.
Atkinson and Piketty (2010), Moriguchi 
and Saez (2010) and Alvaredo et al. (2017) have 
strengthened Minami’s refutation and weak-
ened Kuznet’s growth theory with their statis-
tical work. In Figure 1 below, the evolution of 
top incomes in Japan and America 1913-2015 
are shown. I take these two countries’ top 1% 
income elites as examples of well-known in-
equality evolutions to prove that inequality 
can both rise and fall dramatically regardless of 
growth rates. The graph presents the share of 
total national income received by the top 1% 
in those two countries in any given year. These 
persons are a small minority who received very 
substantial incomes of 18% (Japan) and 20% 
(US) of the national total in the peak year 1925. 
Figure 1: The top 1%’s share of national income in the USA and Japan, 1913-2015. 











In the late 1930s, World War II broke out and 
inequality declined rapidly. In Japan income 
inequality had nearly vanished by 1945. Simi-
larly in the US, top incomes gradually declined 
year after year to a low level both during and 
after the war. Since the 1970s, a reverse course 
begins: in the US the pace stepped up, from an 
8% share in 1978 to an astounding 22% in 2007, 
thereby returning to the heights of the 1920s 
(Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2012). In Japan the rise 
is moderate but significant: from around 8% in 
the 1970s to 11% in 2007. 
In the US the 1% highest income group 
today receives the same share of national in-
come as the 1% did in 1920. Japan’s inequality 
has risen more moderately. The immense shifts 
in inequality occurring in the mid-20th century 
and the significantly diverging patterns in re-
cent decades cannot be explained as a result 
of changing growth rates (Piketty 2014). 
Atkinson & Piketty’s (2010) research breaks 
new ground by using sophisticated statistics 
on wealth to unravel the various dimensions 
of economic inequality and anchor them in 
institutions and historical events. The evolu-
tion of income inequality in Japan and the US 
shown in Figure 1 provides evidence that, un-
like Japan which was defeated and subjected 
to severe destruction in World War II, the US 
emerged unscathed and with a healthier econ-
omy than before, yet the US also experienced a 
reduction in inequality. This is partly explained 
by the labour movement’s increased strength 
during the Great Depression and preparato-
ry planning for war, which led to the govern-
ment’s adoption of various innovations in tax 
and corporate policies as part of the New Deal 
(Piketty, 2014; Moriguchi, 2003). 
In Japan ‘the defining event for the evolu-
tion of income concentration’ was ‘a historical 
accident, namely the Second World War’ (Mori-
guchi & Saez, 2010, p. 78). Its outbreak creat-
ed a series of exigencies that demanded un-
precedented transformations in the economy 
from both capitalist and bureaucratic groups 
(Moriguchi, 2003; Gordon, 1991). The centrality 
of historical accidents and regressive/progres-
sive policies whose influence lasts for decades 
made Piketty & Saez (2014, p. 842) conclude 
that ‘powerful forces [push] alternately in the 
direction of rising or shrinking inequality. 
Which one dominates depends on the institu-
tions that societies choose to adopt’. 
Methodology: income inequality and 
institutions
Without any conclusive linkage between 
growth and economic equality, an explanation 
of inclusive economic development must com-
bine changes in political institutions, legisla-
tion, shifts in the world economy and historical 
accidents. Development research on Japan has 
revealed this but it has paid little attention to 
the central role of inequality. 
Amartya Sen’s (1999) influential ‘human 
development’ theory sought to account for 
necessary virtuous linkages in economic and 
social development. Supported by the United 
Nations’ human development statistics, Sen 
(1999, p. 153) argues that Meiji Japan was the 
‘pioneering example of enhancing economic 
growth through social opportunity, especial-
ly basic education’, achieving higher literacy 
rates than Europe’s growth economies already 
in the 19th century. Literacy, lower mortality 
rates and poverty amelioration must support 
growth in successful development.
The classic Asian ‘developmental state’ 
scholarship (Johnson 1982; Cumings 1984; 
Schmiegelow & Schmiegelow 1990; Chang 
2002) has similarly focused on the mutually en-
hancing aspects of government initiatives and 
income growth. In Japan, in addition to imple-
menting national education, the state initiated 
growth through a state-supported industrial 




ogy imports and taxation to channel resources 
from agriculture to urban centres and various 
monetary policies. 
This article investigates why Japan’s 
growth was highly inegalitarian and how polit-
ical changes turned everything around when 
World War II broke out. I explain the rise of in-
equality by looking into early taxation law and 
the unequal relationship between labour and 
employers’ organisations. I then present pre-
cise data on both income and wealth inequal-
ity to account for the structure of unequal 
economic development and discuss the weak 
impact of post-Great Depression labour legis-
lation on the continuing income scale divides. 
Finally, utilising those data further, the study 
identifies the key years when inequality fell 
and links this dramatic shift to the global finan-
cial economy’s collapse as well as to an array 
of domestic reforms resulting from war-time 
power struggles in government.
The Meiji nation state and early re-
gressive taxation
The Meiji Restoration of 1868 was less of a 
one-sided ‘modernisation’ story of a new re-
gime planting the first seeds of future devel-
opment and more of a ‘revolution from the 
top’ (Lockwood 1968, p. 505) that built upon 
substantial economic developments of the late 
Tokugawa period (Macpherson, 1987, p. 24). 
The victorious Meiji leaders ended the reign of 
local lords and took from them the key prerog-
ative of eliciting taxes from the peasant popu-
lation that cultivated land in Japan’s previously 
fragmented domains. Policy jurisdiction was 
transferred to the central state. The Meiji peri-
od therefore saw the consolidation of a nation-
al bureaucracy in the already emerging urban 
centre of Tokyo. Powerful Tokugawa merchant 
families would continue to expand their wealth 
in the following decades. The major adminis-
trative reform (Gordon 2003, p. 64) established 
a nationally unified tax system based on credit 
payments by each individual following market 
prices. 
Tax reform tied the agricultural economy 
closely to the urban centres and made it sus-
ceptible to administrative initiatives and mar-
ket instability. In 1880 Japan was still predom-
inantly an agricultural economy. 72% of the 
population was employed in agriculture and 
90% of state revenues derived from agricultur-
al land taxes (Minami, 1994, p. 258). The state 
taxed this large and developing resource base, 
channelling resources into incipient urban in-
dustries.
Inequality-reducing tax legislation aimed 
at the emerging high-income industrial econo-
my proved more difficult to implement. In 1887 
Japan’s first wage income tax code was enact-
ed. The Meiji administration sought to impose 
a progressive, rudimentary 1-3% taxation on 
personal income. With people earning below 
300 yen (10 times average annual income) ex-
empted, only 0.3% of the population were li-
able tax payers (Onji & Tang 2017, p. 443). The 
top 1,089 largest companies of the 1880s To-
kyo Stock Exchange, including the wealthiest 
family-owned zaibatsu conglomerates, were in 
large part able to circumvent this law. To avoid 
personal tax, top conglomerates reorganised 
and incorporated smaller companies, gradual-
ly replacing them. By 1892, 54% of large tex-
tile companies had become branches of joint 
stock corporations, and 1/3 of sole proprietors 
disappeared.
Migration and unequal organisation 
between labour and employers 
In the 1880s, on the eve of Japan’s boom in 
manufacturing, peasant families were subject-
ed to the new administrative state’s attempt to 
establish a currency economy. The pressure on 
public finances caused by  the expense of sup-











the 1870s was met by printing large amounts 
of money, which caused high price inflation. 
Finance Minister Matsukata responded to the 
situation by implementing severe deflation 
policies. Almost over night, rice prices declined 
by as much as 50% (Ericson, 2014). These de-
flation policies created a spiral of inequality in 
which desperate peasants became indebted to 
meet rent and tax payments, often having to 
give up land ownership and urge their children 
to take up work in the urban factories to earn 
additional income. These events therefore 
linked up with the tremendous reorganisation 
of labour that took place during Japan’s indus-
trial boom around 1886. 
Japan’s early industrialisation was based 
primarily on textile manufacturing. Between 
1876 and 1900, the agricultural sector’s share 
of employees fell from 78% to 65%, then to 
51% in 1920 (Moriguchi & Saez, 2010, p. 86). By 
1909, 500,000 Japanese were employed in tex-
tile manufacturing. With 50% of total national 
exports consisting of textiles, the sector ac-
counted for 60% of all growth until 1938 (Mina-
mi, 1994, p. 98). No less than 85% of this work-
force was female and nearly all of them were 
migrant peasant daughters in their late teens 
(Patrick, 1976, p. 59). 
According to labour scholar Tsurumi 
(1990), during these decades factory com-
pounds were institutions of social control. Be-
cause urban residents knew about the degrad-
ing and miserable conditions, factory owners 
were forced to recruit girls from rural regions 
where fathers, hardpressed by debt, forced 
their daughters to become textile hands. The 
living quarters of locked and fenced off factory 
dorms were tightly packed with small sleeping 
pads and inadequate bathing facilities having 
‘more in common with a prison’ (Yamamura, 
1997, p. 257). The small portions of bad quality 
food that were served every day were a major 
reason for flight and caused malnutrition. A 
death rate of 9% was probably normal. Work-
ing twelve hours a day, cotton hands were 
forced to work demanding night shifts every 
second week. The result was a turnover rate of 
100% (ibid., pp. 256-261). Tsurumi (1990, p. 138) 
argues that only 10% of the girls in this heart 
of production were literate, which underlines 
how force rather than education was neces-
sary to make people contribute to the new so-
cio-economic system, as one worker song tes-
tified: ‘Factory work is prison work. All it lacks 
are iron chains’ (ibid., p. 98). 
Factory owners, on the other hand, formed 
wide-ranging organisations. In the absence of 
state regulation, the Yamanashi and Suwal silk 
employers’ alliances wrote legislative treaties 
that gave them the right to fire employees 
without constraint and to unilaterally set and 
withhold wages while making it compulsory 
for workers to stay at the same company for a 
whole year (1990, pp. 49, 74).
After World War I, social activism and la-
bour unionisation became major movements 
in Japan. The urban labour organisation 
Friendly Society, founded in 1917, became the 
largest union, the Japan Confederation of La-
bour. Closely studied by Gordon (1991) and 
Garon (1987), the proliferation of civil society 
organisations was based on widespread pro-
test against low material living standards and 
against lacking acknowledgement of labour’s 
contribution to the economy. The fact that in 
Nankatsu, Tokyo’s principal industrial centre, 
union membership grew from approximately 
2% to 32% of the local labour force between 
1912 and 1929—reaching approximately 7.9% 
on a national level—is testimony to the vital-
ity of community-building in an environment 
where unions were still formally illegal (Gor-
don, 1991, p. 186). Union proliferation led to 
a comparable increase in disputes between 
workers and employers which rose from 500 to 




movement undeniably produced impressive 
victories for social progress: In 1922 women 
won the right of freedom of association and 
free public speech. In 1925 universal male suf-
frage was implemented (in 1908, only about 
47,000 qualified to vote in elections). A year lat-
er a bill in the Japanese parliament, the Diet, 
legalised labour disputes. In 1928 night work 
by women and children was prohibited by law. 
At labour’s peak strength in 1931 following the 
Great Depression, the elected representatives 
in the lower Diet found themselves flanked 
by socialist parties that had roots in the urban 
proletariat and they even managed to pass a 
bill to legalise unions, but the upper Diet’s un-
elected members stopped the law indefinitely.
Slow material improvements, repressive 
factory institutions and unequal political rights 
spurred workers to organise themselves and 
to pressure employers through disputes and 
parliamentary participation. This movement 
achieved victories that resulted in better la-
bour market regulation. However, this legisla-
tion was not enough to substantially reduce 
economic inequality, which contined to rise 
until the 1930s.
Wealthy dynasties, capital and cor-
porations: expansion in the 1920s
We saw in Figure 1 that the share of national 
income going to the 1% highest income group 
was 20% until 1937. It did not decline during 
the labour movement’s activist years. Howev-
er, compared to wealth, capital and property, 
which accumulated rapidly through this peri-
od, income was relatively equally distributed. 
Moriguchi & Saez’s (2010) account of Japanese 
estates—the capital portfolios and properties 
inherited within the wealthiest families—be-
gins with data from 1905. 
In Figure 2 below we observe the evo-
lution of capital concentration among these 
rich families. The wealthiest 5-2%, of families 
owned substantial wealth compared to the 
rest of society. Their assets maintained values 
that floated around 10-20 million yen until 
the 1940s. However, this small wealthy group 
did not truly participate in the rapid econom-
ic changes taking place. The rise and fall of 
wealth is much more strongly pronounced 
Data source: Moriguchi & Saez (2010, pp. 147-8). 
Figure 2: The top 1% and top 5-2% of the Japanese wealth scale from the 1905 until World War II.
Wealth inequality remained anchored primarily in the properties of Japan’s 1%. Their fortunes surged upwards 











among the top 1%. Their fortunes grew from 
40 million yen in 1905 and peaked at over 250 
million in 1936. The evolution was towards ever 
higher inequality, with a temporary precipi-
tous decline during the Great Depression, but 
without a lasting fall until 1938, the very same 
year when income inequality took a nosedive. 
This scale of capital accumulation meant that 
income growth alone could never substantially 
reduce inequality. For the entire nation, annu-
al growth rates reached 2.1% between 1905-
1936 (Maddison 2003, pp. 180-182), but capital 
grew at the faster rate of 7.4% for the top 1%, 
3.5 times faster. This is consistent with Piketty’s 
(2014, p. 25) ‘fundamental inequality’ of capital 
growth exceeding income growth in extreme-
ly unequal societies.
The realm of the Japanese capitalist aris-
tocracy is well-known. Throughout the 1920s, 
zaibatsu conglomerates grew and expanded 
their power (Minami, 1994, p. 114). Reflecting 
traditional aristocratic values, the Japanese es-
tate was organised around patriarchy with the 
head of a dynasty managing the bulk of family 
wealth while also holding authority in overlap-
ping board memberships in a conglomerate’s 
corporate and banking branches. When possi-
ble, these positions and assets were inherited 
by the first-born son. In Figure 3, an overview 
of their wealth shows how capital property 
yields higher income: vast agricultural land 
ownership (34% of all wealth) provided prop-
erty owners with income from renting farm-
land and housing to tenant families. With the 
new capital economy, massive amounts of fi-
nancial assets (50% of total in 1937) provided 
high returns to stockholders in banks and cor-
porations.
Wartime reform and economic col-
lapse: the fall of inequality
A series of historical events led to the demise 
of capital and extreme inequality in Japan. 
Labour unrest in the 1930s provided strong 
Data source: Moriguchi & Saez (2010, p. 151)
Figure 3: Composition of Japanese wealth, 1925-1950. Both agricultural and residential property 
remained key sources of wealth and rental income until the 1940s, but financial assets constituted 




evidence for affluent circles that society and 
economy were dysfunctional. They held an 
‘obssessive fear […] that domestic society was 
collapsing’ (Gordon 1991, p. 10), and groups 
of reform bureaucrats ‘believed that radical 
policies to nationalize industries, control pri-
vate property, and thereby eliminate popular 
discontent were essential to national defense’ 
and ‘to reduce the tremendous gap between 
the rich and poor’ (ibid, p. 279).
The state became an arena for conflict 
and collaboration between capital managers 
and civil servants. In 1938, the war-preparatory 
Mobilisation Law was passed, which in princi-
ple allowed the bureaucracy to control Japan’s 
corporations. To accommodate business lead-
ers in the wartime plans, the former Mitsubishi 
zaibatsu and Bank of Japan executive, Ikeda 
Seihin, entered government as the first min-
ister of a newly established powerful Ministry 
of Finance. He tried to preserve independence 
in corporate boards while aligning their corpo-
rations to the war effort. Ikeda was forced to 
resign after clashing with the Home Ministry’s 
planners who favoured stronger state-cen-
tered coordination (Johnson, 1982, pp. 145-8).
The shifting wartime governments man-
aged to implement an array of unprecedented 
reforms to bolster social stability. They regulat-
ed and standardised wages across industries 
both at the top and bottom; they mandat-
ed workers’ councils in factories to empower 
state-governed unions; and they put a ceiling 
on executive wages. The regressive tax system 
was finally turned around with the imposition 
of heavier taxation on corporate and rental 
income each year after 1938, while land was 
redistributed from property owners to tenant 
farmers and rice prices were fixed. In the stock 
market, war bonds replaced generous state 
obligations, thus nullifying a major rental in-
come for capital-owners (Moriguchi & Saez, 
2010, p. 101). 
With Japan’s defeat in 1945, the economy 
was in an advanced state of collapse. Hyperin-
flation increased the cost of goods 150 times in 
just two years. Zaibatsu empires in Asia were 
dismantled in conjunction with  the American 
occupation government’s demobilisation of 
the army. All these forces in combination dra-
matically weakned the institutions that had 
supported capital clusters. As Figure 3 shows 
corporate stocks and financial assets which 
had constituted 52% of estate wealth in 1938 
fell to a mere 17% by 1950.
 A new constitution legalised labor unions 
for the first time in an attempt to muster pop-
ular support for breaking up the zaibatsu con-
glomerates. In the crisis environment of infla-
tion, food scarcity, unemployment, labour was 
revitalised like never before. In just four years, 
independent union membership came to cov-
er 56% of the workforce. In June 1946, 157,000 
Japanese participated in 233 takeovers of fac-
tories. After averting a planned national strike 
that involved 6 million people, the occupation 
government again decided to douse activism 
by making public union strikes illegal (Gordon, 
1998, pp. 7-10). 
In sum, historical accidents in the form of a 
collapsing global economy and hyperinflation 
decimated family-owned wealth clusters. Pol-
icies intended to foster social stability during 
war redistributed economic resources. Strong 
labour organisations only played a secondary 
role in the overall development by influencing 
parliament’s legislation (Gordon, 1998; Esp-
ing-Andersen, 1990). 
Conclusion
Japan’s pre-World War II political economy of 
development transformed it into the first Asian 
country that reached high income levels. It was 
at the same time among the most inegalitarian 
countries in modern history. As a result of the 











of capital, growing wealth inequality inhibited 
the possible positive effects of national income 
growth and early labour rights and tax legisla-
tion. Growth alone did not constitute a virtu-
ous cycle. The turn-around took place in a time 
span of just 8 years and was directly linked to 
the breaking up of old power constellations. 
World War II both compelled and enabled the 
government to implement a flurry of first-time 
progressive taxation, to redistribute property, 
to reforge capital bonds and even to empower 
labour.   
For development scholarship, the central 
conclusion is that policies designed to pro-
mote growth which neglect redistribution 
constitute a weak and disjointed approach to 
development in which growth may even lead 
to deeper socio-economic inequalities. This 
proposition is strengthened by the fact that 
the considerable victories in Japanese labour 
market regulation and social rights legislation 
won in parliament helped narrow social gaps 
but had a limited direct impact on the im-
mense scale of income and wealth inequality. 
Only direct taxation and redistribution, or cri-
sis events with comparable harmful effects to 
capital, alleviated that divide. 
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